PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL IN THE NEW
CENTURY: ARE UNIVERSITIES PREPARED?
In recent years, intellectual property has become increasingly important
to academic institutions throughout the United States. As universities
rely more heavily on trademarks and patents for additional revenue,
questions arise as to whether these institutions are sufficiently protected
by their current intellectual property policies. This iBrief explores the
policies promulgated by a variety of academic institutions and assesses
whether these universities are adequately protected by their policies.
Academia is both an industry with marked similarities to many in the private sector and
an institution uniquely charged with the discovery and promulgation of knowledge in our society.
In both those guises, universities produce valuable patents, copyrights and other intellectual
capital. From a strategic policy standpoint, important questions arise, both for these institutions
and their corporate partners. Are intellectual property interests protected by the presence of valid
university intellectual property policies, or is there cause for concern? In an effort to answer this
question, this iBrief examines university policies for the purpose of determining which academic
institutions, private or public—in the aggregate—are more likely to maintain protective policies.
We conclude that disturbingly few institutions have promulgated intellectual property policies.
Thus, there is cause for legitimate concern that financial investment in research is likely in many
cases not to be protected. Industries funding academic research may need to review the scope
and extent of their own contracts with academia as well as reconsider their associations with
institutions that fail to maintain or implement protective intellectual property policies.

Establishing the Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty, a seminal employment law concept, is based on the “servant’s”
traditional common-law duty of loyalty to the “master.” Today, loyalty is often embodied in
various forms of non-competition agreements, under which the employee expressly agrees to
refrain from competing against or misappropriating the proprietary knowledge of the employer.
American courts often will enforce such promises, if properly supported by legal consideration
flowing to the servant.1
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In some states, legislatures have seen fit to capture, or revise, the common law loyalty
rules in statutes.2 Non-competition policies, however, are usually embodied in an employment
contract or employment policy. Non-competition clauses, as well as patent, inventions and trade
secret rules of all sorts within contracts and policies have become standard within corporate
industry. There exists no wide-ranging study of these strategic employment policies among
academic institutions, which as an industry like many of those in the private sector also produces
valuable patents, copyrights and other intellectual property. The growth of the “research for sale”
industry by way of corporate-university partnerships begs the question: at these public and
private institutions of higher learning, who owns what? Are corporate interests protected by the
presence of valid university intellectual property policies, or should corporations be concerned?

Assessing the Policies – Our Methodology
The Faculty Appointment Policy Archive,3 a database of 241 randomly selected university
employment policies or collective bargaining agreements compiled by the Harvard Graduate
School of Education, serves as the foundation from which we are able to comparatively examine
public and private academic institutional employment policies or agreements related to trade
secrets, patents, inventions, trademarks, and copyrights.

Unlike the for-profit sector of the

economy, the tradition in higher education has been that faculty own their own creative and
written works.

The exception has been in the area of patents and inventions, over which

institutions have held tighter control.
An initial review of the data found loyalty policies to be general clauses of dependability
and reliability. Further, copyright policies were primarily related to a researcher’s adherence to
copyright laws as they relate to the duplication of class materials for distribution and to the
ownership of written works. Similarly, of the fourteen trademark policies found, half are related
to the use of university logos and similar design, with the remaining related to intellectual
property protection.
While we present a frequency analysis for each of these polices from the sample, we also
delve deeper into those intellectual property policies, patent and inventions policies, which are
more likely to hold corporate intellectual property interests. Clearly, the debate surrounding
copyright issues and the ownership of online course material is sufficient to warrant a separate
article. Rather, our analysis focuses on patent and invention policies. Following an assessment
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of present and past trends as well as an in-depth legal analysis, we conduct CHI-Squared analysis4
testing to determine whether the university’s public or private status is independent to the
existence of these intellectual property policies.
We offer the following hypotheses:

Test: 1
H0: The public or private university status is independent of the existence of patent
policies.
H1: The public or private university status is not independent of the existence of patent
policies.

Test: 2
H0: The public or private university status is independent of the existence of invention
policies.
H1:

The public or private university status is not independent of the existence of

invention policies.
Industry’s contributions to academia are approaching $2 billion per year, representing a
ten-time multiple of 1979 rates.5 It would seem logical that private institutions, motivated by
funding opportunities, have a greater stake in the development of new patents and other forms of
valuable intellectual property and thus have promulgated intellectual property right policies more
so than public institutions. From our CHI-Squared and frequency analysis we can determine
whether these intellectual property right policies are more prevalent at public or private
institutions.

The Present Condition
Academics and corporate America have in the past maintained a symbiotic relationship,
in that corporate funding or venture capital is expected, provided and received in exchange for
equity in research findings and developments. “According to the National Science Foundation,
corporate funding of academic labs has more than doubled over ten years, to close to $2 billion in
4

The chi-square test measures the degree to which a theoretical frequency distribution
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relied more heavily upon research grants and other privately-funded R&D than their public sector
counterparts, these private institutions would be better protected by adequate patent and other
intellectual property policies.

1997.”6 This has clearly been disturbing to some in academia who argue that universities should
be pursuing research for the sake of developing a body of knowledge in various disciplines rather
than collaborating with private industry.7 Despite cries for an “untainted” academic environment,
corporate/university yearning for collaboration was clearly displayed by the 1998 landmark deal
between Novartis and the University of California, Berkeley. Novartis, the Swiss biotechnology
and agrochemical institute is providing $25 million over five years in addition to access to
proprietary technology and DNA databases to UC Berkeley’s Department of Plant & Microbial
Biology in the College of Natural Resources. In return, Novartis will receive first rights to
negotiate for roughly thirty to forty percent of the discoveries made in the department.8
Funding sources and successes are plentiful, according to a 1999 survey by the
Association of University Technology Managers.

Including research agreements aimed at

achieving scientific breakthroughs and contracts for the development of distance learning course
materials, universities and colleges amassed more than $576 million in royalties from inventions
licensed to industry in fiscal 1998 and were awarded more than 2681 patents. The surveyed
institutions also reported forming 279 start-up companies based on inventions by their faculty or
graduate students.9

Past Trends
Many university/corporate resource agreements were developed during the 1980s in order
to offset revenue shortfalls in more traditional categories of college revenue. Tuition increases
made it difficult for parents to be full-payers and institutions often made deep discounts on their
“sticker prices.”

Federal research funding diminished.

Meanwhile, rising overhead costs

outpaced institutions’ ability to fund faculty research on their own. While universities were
struggling to meet costs, corporate America shared similar economic difficulties.10 Downsizing
became common, even popular in corporate boardrooms, as companies reduced and eliminated
unprofitable units and functions – among them research and development departments.
Corporate realization that R&D was intrinsic, indeed critical, to future industrial growth initiated
a search for alternative production outlets.
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During the same period, the passage of the Government Patent Policy Act,11 which
became effective in July 1981, ended years of confusion over the ownership and
commercialization of government sponsored research.

Until that time, the ownership and

commercialization of government-sponsored research was governed by twenty-six separate
federal agency regulations. Specifically, this Act “established a presumption that ownership of
all patent rights in federally funded research would vest in any contractor qualifying as a
nonprofit research institution or small business.”12 These federal policy changes led corporate
R&D managers increasingly to approach research-producing universities that could help meet
industry demand for growth and innovation. Determining that there would be mutual economic
benefit, university administrators embraced the joint venture concept.13
Companies funding academic research were afforded exclusive rights to that research.
Information that typically flowed freely now only flowed to one source, the company. Caught
between the university’s need for resources and the company’s need for secrecy often
compromised an academic’s ethical posture.14 Companies asserted control by insisting that
funding would only be available in return for research secrecy and exclusive rights to the
intellectual property produced. Enticed by the moneymaking opportunity, both universities and
their faculty relinquished ownership rights and in doing so, their rights to an open exchange of
knowledge and information.

Legal Perspective
Unless there exists a clear and unambiguous contract or policy, as is often found in
corporate/academic partnerships, determining ownership of intellectual property within an
academic environment is clearly an arduous task. There are few reported cases that address
whether the educational institution or the faculty member owns the property created by the
faculty member.15 In environments other than academia, it has long been established that the
employer owns property created by an employee. This is stipulated under the “work made for
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hire” section of the Copyright Act of 1976.16 Conversely, faculty members, under the principle of
academic freedom, are typically allowed to own the property they created.17

In the past,

administrators have left copyright issues unchallenged because the value of most copyrighted
material was insignificant. However, with the advent of web-based and related multimedia
software, universities are re-evaluating their stance on ownership of copyrighted intellectual
property.18
Another significant factor causing universities to re-think their views is the
commercialization of intellectual property.

It is the hope of colleges and universities that

commercializing intellectual property will help increase revenue to support further research.
Commercialization also raises new issues of third party involvement, especially when large
corporations are among the players. The concern is that corporations do not have the same
commitment to research for academic advancement as universities. As a result, their involvement
may hinder the researcher’s ability to publicize new information.19

Copyrights
Fair use is yet another issue affecting intellectual property rights and is a statutory
defense to copyright infringement. The Copyright Act of 1976 establishes that certain uses of
copyrighted works may be considered fair “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”20
There are four factors courts consider when determining fair use of copyrighted material: (1)
whether the nature of the use is for commercial or educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work itself; (3) how substantial the portion used is relevant to the entire work; and
(4) what effect did the use have on the potential market value of the copyrighted work.21
The United States Constitution establishes that Congress shall have power “To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writing and Discoveries.”22

This assertion permits

Congress to grant a copyright to a person creating original literary, musical and artistic work.23
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The “work made for hire” rule serves as an exception. In Weinstein v. University of Illinois,24 a
professor of pharmacy brought suit against his co-author, university administrators and the
university alleging they published his article placing his name as the last author rather than as first
author. By this action, the university deprived him of his property with out due process.25
Weinstein received two negative evaluations and was given a terminal contract from the
University of Illinois due to his failure to publish during his employment.26 The federal district
court found against Weinstein citing that the university owned the rights to the article, as it was a
work for hire.27
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the 1976 Act
broad enough to make all academic articles a “work for hire.”28 The court further stipulated that
the “work for hire” policy applied more to administrative reports than academic journal articles.29
If the Dean of the College of Pharmacy sought to make the Weinstein article a work for hire, he
would have had to attain an affidavit declaring that professors routinely ask for consent before
they publish articles.30

Further, any co-authors would have had to gain consent from the

university before publishing.31 The Dean instructed Weinstein to publish but did not insist he
gain the permission of the university to do so.32 Since faculty owned the copyrights to their
articles, the court further ruled that the dispute between Weinstein and his co-author was a
contractual dispute governed by state law.33

Patents
In Chou v. University of Chicago, a patent rights case, researcher Dr. Joany Chou sued
the university for the patent on research she conducted involving the alteration of DNA to change
a virus from virulent to avirulent.34 After Chou resigned, her advisor Dr. Bernard Roizman,
chairman of the university’s Department of Molecular Genetics applied for three patents pertinent
to the research.35 Chou’s name was listed on only one of the patents.36 Consequently, she filed a
24
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complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois asserting that she
was the inventor of all three patents but did not receive the financial benefits to which she was
entitled.37 Chou sought to be declared sole or joint inventor on one of the patents, and joint
inventor on the other two.38 The court dismissed two of the three claims, stating that as part of
her employment with the university, she relinquished her rights and interests in the patents.39 The
court reasoned that Chou can dispute the rights to ownership of the diagrams, drawings, writings
and documentation she created during her employment40 but later dismissed her claim, with
prejudice, determining that the chances of there being conversion and any significant damages
were practically nil.41
Although it is true that most universities are prepared to let their professors enjoy the
insignificant rewards of publishing an article, they have recently been formulating policies that
assert their joint or full ownership over property that is created with the use of university
materials or facilities.42 Most researchers use university office supplies, computers, books from
the university library, a secretary employed by the university or a research assistant. Universities
have wavered on enforcing these rights for two reasons: first, to avoid conflict with their faculty
members and second, there was uncertainty about whether or not these policies were legally
enforceable.43
On July 3, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision in Chou on several key issues.44 The threshold and most significant issue
— one characterized by the appellate panel as being of first impression in U.S. patent law — was
“whether a putative inventor who is obligated to assign her invention to another is entitled to sue
for correction of ownership.”45

The court answered this novel question in the affirmative,

recognizing that a university’s published patent policies could form an implied contract with an
employee, such as a researcher or faculty member.46 Thus, although Chou had never actually
signed an express contract assigning the rights to any patentable inventions she developed, the
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facts that (1) her employment letter referenced the “administrative policies of the University,” and
(2) these policies included the university’s patent policy, together satisfied the Seventh Circuit.
The court then proceeded to find that, despite this assignment by implied contract, Chou retained
interests as an inventor, which gave her standing to sue for correction of the patents to include her
name.47
One such interest is her reputation. “Chou argues that a reputational interest alone is
enough to satisfy the requirements of ... standing. That assertion is not implausible. After all,
being considered an inventor of important subject matter is a mark of success in one’s field,
comparable to being an author of an important scientific paper.”48 But beyond this reputational
interest, the court found that as an inventor Chou is entitled to a share in gross royalties and upfront licensing fees, if any.49
What can one conclude? The good news for universities and the corporations that partner
with them is that “[a]side from ... relatively minor qualifications, employers have broad powers
— consistently upheld by the courts — to claim employee inventions by contract,” and
universities qua employers of faculty and research associates are no exception.50 On the other
hand, universities will be held to their published policies and will be required to give a share of
royalties and license fees to all those research team-members found to be substantive contributors
to the invention. Neither courts nor arbitrators will look kindly upon insider agreements that aim
at cutting out low echelon team members from the fruits of the collective labors. University
researchers, even “lowly” research assistants and post-docs, are well-advised to consult legal
counsel prior to executing employment contracts, non-competition agreements, assignments of
rights, or even acknowledgments of their receipt of and commitment to review employment
policies.

Policy Review & Results
The Harvard Graduate School of Education, Faculty Appointment Policy Archive,
provided a sample of 241 randomly selected university employment policies or collective
bargaining agreements from a population of 1380 U.S. four-year institutions ranging across the
Carnegie classifications. Surprisingly, considering the vast amount of valuable research produced
at academic institutions, the results of our frequency analysis depict a low occurrence of
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intellectual property rights policies, each at or below twenty percent of the sample. From Test 1,
the estimated CHI – Square statistic was 5.2186 with a P-value of 0.0223. The critical value for
this test is 3.8418. The null hypothesis is rejected. In test 2 results, the estimated CHI – Square
statistic was 5.1979 with a P-value of 0.0226. The critical value for this test is 3.8418. The null
hypothesis is also rejected. What this means, in layman's terms, is that (1) the majority of
universities which responded to the survey either had no such policies or policies which were
clearly inadequate, and (2) these statistics are reliable predictors of the state of affairs across
higher education as whole.
Based on a sample of universities, it is also evident that public or private status is a
predictor of the existence of patent policies. From our frequency and CHI-Squared analysis, we
can predict that patent and invention policies are more prevalent at public than private
institutions. This finding contradicts our previously stated hypothesis that private institutions,
seeking income through the development of valuable patents and other intellectual property,
would have promulgated intellectual property policies more so than public institutions.

It

suggests to us that in the increasingly competitive environment of higher education, public
universities are emulating their private-sector counterparts in questing for corporate research
dollars, presumably to compensate for the stinginess and (during the past two years) impecunious
positions of many state treasuries.
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